麻省理工學院「開放式課程網頁」 | 經濟學 | 14.03 2000秋季課程：中級個體經濟學應用


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教學大綱
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教科書

Nicholson，Walter，《個體經濟學理論：基本原理及展論》。7th ed. New York：Dryden Press，1997

課堂閱讀

有大量的圖表性閱讀資料。每星期會指定教科書以外的閱讀資料，這些閱讀在本課程中是非常重要的，但有些太過偏技術性的文章則不需要詳讀。指定的閱讀資料將在上課時告知，隨附的問題則能提供閱讀重點的指引。要注意的是，有些文章是放在網路上的，若找不到閱讀資料時請至網上的教學時程表中確認。(檔案一有修改過)

其他有用的參考資料

Binger，Brian R.，and Elizabeth Hoffman《個體經濟學之微積分》2nd ed. Reading，Mass.：Addison-Wesley，1998
這是除了Nicholson的讀本外另一個選擇，以數學推衍解說的部份較多。第1至3章就本課程用到的工具，提供了比Nicholson版更詳盡的數理化介紹。覺得Nicholson 版的第2章解說不夠詳細者可參考此書。

Gibbons，Robert《應用經濟學中的賽局理論》 Princeton，N.J.：Princeton University Press，1992. (本書有平裝本)
本書對此課程中的賽局理論有非常完整的介紹。

Simon，Carl P.，and Lawrence Blume《數學經濟學》New York：W. W. Norton，1994.
這是本深入淺出的參考書。

Shapiro，Carl，and Hal R. Varian《資訊原則：網路經濟的策略指導》 Boston：Harvard Business School Press，1999

作業

本課程約有8個習題會於課堂後發放，並在每週的實習課討論。習題通常分為兩部份：一部份著重在教科書及課堂講稿中所衍生的技術性問題；另一部份的應用性問題則主要來自指定閱讀資料及課堂中的討論。作業必須要在規定繳交日的下午5點前送達，逾時者不予計分，絕無寬貸。

為了通融非人為事件的發生，生病或與你個人排程的衝突，在計算你的成績時，我們會刪掉最差的一次(例如，你沒繳交作業的那次)。

考試，作業，課堂表現及成績

成績計算： 作業 25%. 3次考試，每次佔25% 。 課堂表現成績外加。.

你的課堂貢獻度。大體而言，我會向上調整以下這些學生的分數 - 上課前有準備，課堂討論參與度高，並願意與人分享他們的想法 - 即使這些想法並不一定正確. 優良的課堂參與態度能增加你的成績至多到2/3 (例如，直接從 B 升至 A-)。我保留在課堂上點名的權利。

會有三次的考試，兩次在課堂上，最後一次在期末考期間。隨堂考每次為 90 分鐘，第三次考試大約會有兩個小時。兩次隨堂考試我會試著錯開期中考期間，這也就是說你們將有更多的時間來準備這科的考試，也因此考試題目會更有挑戰性。

每次的考試題目會集中在前次考試後所教的新內容，但當然你得先瞭解舊的部份才能學好新的。考題依據教科書，作業，指定閱讀教材及課堂討論內容。考試的成績將與作業成績有高度相關性。

本課程的計分方式不致太過嚴苛；每個人都可能獲得不錯的成績。同時，在分配成績時我將會考慮相對的表現；如果當次考試的最高分為75 分，我會給其 A的成績，而非 C+。

課堂的參與及貢獻

這並非一門僅憑教科書就能唸好的科目，若你以為只要有課本就可忽略上課，你將得到很差的成績。如果你打算在這門課上課的同時選修另一堂課，我強烈的勸你打消這個念頭。之前曾試著這樣做的學生都得到很差的成績- 只有拿到老師所給的一點點同情分數。不管如何，這不是一般性的個經理論課，而且課本也無法完全涵蓋我們在本學期將討論的所有課題。

對分數有疑問

當你對分數有疑問時，先直接去找我們的助教。對作業或考試成績的疑問，必須由助教接受，要在收到成績後一周內提出. 超過一週後的上訴一律不受理。要求重計分者應遵循下列步驟：

將你認為有問題的部份以清楚明確的描述摘要下來，連同相關的資料交給助教。(影印一份你的摘要及作業/考題自己留底。)將你的資料，摘要和e-mail留給助教。
等助教以e-mail與你聯絡後，再到助教室討論問題。

這套流程是為了提供你們的助教在回覆前，有個仔細思考你的疑問的機會，好幫助確認得到公平的成績。

上課時程表

每堂課的主題及閱讀資料有可能會適時修訂，如時間不足，有些主題及相關閱讀可能會被跳過。

課程大綱

(*) 星號為必要的閱讀資料

1.1. 課程簡介

1.2. 供給及需求法則的複習

1.3. 個體經濟模型，相對均衡，及最適化

(*) Nicholson. 第1 及 2 章。

Pindyck 與 Rubinfeld 第1.1-1.3章。

(*) Krugman，Paul〈意外的理論家〉Slate (January 23，1997)。

(*) Card，David，and Alan B. Krueger〈最低工資及就業：紐澤西及賓州第一食品公司個案研究〉American Economic Review 84，No. 4 (September 1994)：772-93。

(*) Freeman，Richard 〈評論：神話及計量學：最低工資的新經濟學〉 Industrial and Labor Relations Review 48，No. 4 (July 1995)。

(*) Kennan，John 〈最低工資的微妙影響〉 Journal of Economic Literature 33 (December，1995)：1950-65。

Card，David，and Alan B. Krueger 〈神話與計量學：最低工資的新經濟學」 Princeton：Princeton University Press，1995。

2. 選擇及需求理論

2.1. 理性原則，效用，和無異曲線

2.2. 強制效用最大化，需求機能，間接效用，消費支出功用

2.3. 個人需求，所得及替代品影響

2.4. 替代品與互補品，市場需求，及彈性

2.5. 物價指數

(*) Nicholson，第3-7

(*) Dwyer，G. P.，and C. M. Lindsey〈羅伯特季芬與愛爾蘭馬鈴薯〉 American Economic Review (March 1984)：188-192

(*) Waldfogel，Joel〈聖誕節的無謂損失〉American Economic Review 83，no. 5 (1993)：1328-36

(*) Boskin，Michael，et al〈朝向更精準的生活成本計算」Interim report to the Senate Finance Committee from the Advisory Commission to Study the Consumer Price Index. September 15，1995

(*) Krugman，Paul〈消費者物價指數與老鼠競賽〉Slate (December 21，1996)

3. 選手與不確定性，及資訊

3.1. 不確定性，風險，Von Neumann-Morgenstern 預期效用

(*) Nicholson 第8章

(*) Kane，Thomas J.，and Douglas Staiger 〈少女媽媽與墮胎權〉 Quarterly Journal of Economics 111，no. 2 (1996)：467-506

4. 價格，完全競爭，一般均衡及經濟效率

4.1. 經濟效率與福利分析

4.2. 一般競爭均衡

4.3. 貿易，相對優勢，競爭力，與重分配

(*) Nicholson 第15，16，和17章

(*) Scherer，F. M. 〈美國糖業計劃》，摘自 Kennedy School of Government Case 1992，pp. 1128.0.

(*) Krugman，Paul〈競爭力：一種危險的迷思〉 Foreign Affairs 73，no. 2 (March - April，1994)：28-44

(*) Krugman，Paul〈自由貿易的酸果〉Slate (November 21，1997)

(*) Krugman，Paul〈稅制改革迷思〉New York Times Magazine (April 7，1996)：36-37

5. 資訊經濟學：保險，道德危機，反向選擇，及信號傳遞

(*) Nicholson，第 8 及第9章，(注意：遺憾的是第 9章對資訊這個主題的介紹太過簡略)

(*) Rothschild，Michael，and Joseph E. Stiglitz 〈競爭的保險市場的均衡：資訊經濟學論文〉 Quarterly Journal of Economics 90，no. 4 (1976)：630-649

(*) Altman，Daniel，David M. Cutler，and Richard J. Zeckhauser，〈反向的選擇與保留〉 American Economic Review 88，no. 2 (1998)：122-12

(*) Akerlof，George A. 〈檸檬市場：品質的不確定性與市場機制〉Quarterly Journal of Economics 84，no. 3 (August 1970)：488-500

(*) Spence，Michael 〈就業市場的信號傳遞〉Quarterly Journal of Economics 87，no. 3 (1973)：355-374

(*) Tyler，John H.，Richard J. Murnane，and John B. Willet 〈評價勞動市場中教育信號傳遞的顯著價值〉Quarterly Journal of Economics 115，no. 2 (2000)：431-468

6. 賽局理論與資訊時代網路外部化的應用

(*) Nicholson 第10章

建議：Gibbons，應用經濟學的賽局理論，第1 及第 2章

(*) David，Paul E. 〈克萊奧女神與電腦鍵盤經濟學〉American Economic Review 75，no. 2 (1985)：332-337

(*) Shapiro，Carl，and Hal R. Varian《資訊原則》Boston：Harvard Business School Press，1999，第3 及第 7章，pp. 173-226

(*) Krugman，Paul，〈娛樂事業的價值〉Slate (January 22，1998)

Syllabus (PDF)

Text

Nicholson, Walter. Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions. 7th ed. New York: Dryden Press, 1997.

Course Reader

A packet of reading materials is available at Graphic Arts. Readings (in addition to the text) will be assigned every week. The reading is important for the course, but some of the articles have more technical sections that are not required. Reading assignments will given in class and problem sets will provide further guidance as to what is important. Note that some class articles are on the web but not in the reader. Check the syllabus for a URL before you conclude that the article is missing.

Other Useful References

Binger, Brian R., and Elizabeth Hoffman. Microeconomics with Calculus. 2nd ed. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1998.
An alternative to Nicholson but more math and less intuition. Chapters 1-3 provide a more detailed mathematical introduction to the tools of this course than Nicholson. If you are dissatisfied with Nicholson's chapter 2, you should look here.

Gibbons, Robert. Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992. (Also in paperback.)
A great introductory reference for the game theory part of the class.

Simon, Carl P., and Lawrence Blume. Mathematics for Economists. New York: W. W. Norton, 1994.
This is a great source that starts with the basics and goes quite deep.

Shapiro, Carl, and Hal R. Varian. Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999.

Problem Sets

This course will require approximately eight problem sets that are due in class and will be discussed in the weekly recitation section. The problems sets normally have two parts: one covering more technical problems out of the text book and class lectures and the other covering applications based on the assigned reading and class discussion. Problem sets will not be accepted after 5 pm on the stated due date. After 5 pm of the due date, you will receive no credit for your assignment. There will be no exceptions.

In order to accommodate unanticipated events, illness, or conflicts in your schedule, we will drop the problem set with the lowest score (for example, the one that you don』t hand in) when computing your problem set grade.

Exams, Problem Sets, Classroom Performance, and Grading

Grading: Problem sets 25%. 3 exams, 25% each. Plus in-class performance.

Your in-class contribution matters. I adjust grades upwards - sometimes substantially - for students who prepare for class, participate in class discussion, and take risks by sharing their ideas - even if those ideas aren』t always correct. Excellent class participation can increase your grade by as much as two-thirds of a letter grade (e.g., from straight B to A-). I reserve the right to cold call in class.

Three exams will be given, two in class and one during final exam period. The in-class exams will be 90 minutes each and the third exam will probably be closer to two hours. I attempt to stagger the exams so that they don』t fall during regular mid-term period. This means that you can give more time to studying for 14.03 exams, and the exams will be more challenging accordingly.

Each exam will only focus on the new material since the last exam, although of course you will need to understand the older material to apply the new material. The exams will be based on the textbook, the problem sets, the assigned readings, and classroom discussion. Performance on exams is highly correlated with performance problem sets.

The class is not graded on a strict curve; it's possible for everyone to do well. At the same time, I do take into account relative performance when assigning grades; if the high score on an exam is 75 points, I call that an A, not a C+.

On Attending and Contributing to Class

This is not a textbook class and you will do poorly if you miss the lectures on the assumption that you can make it up with the textbook. If you were planning to take another class that meets at the same time as 14.03, I strongly discourage it. Students who have tried this in the past fared poorly - and received little sympathy from the instructor. For better or worse, this is not a generic micro-theory class and accordingly our textbook does not adequately cover everything we』ll be discussing this semester.

Questions Regarding Grading

Questions regarding grading are to be directed first to our TAs. Questions regarding the grading of a problem set or exams must be received by the TA no later than one week after the problem set or exam has been handed back. After one week, no appeals will be considered. To have the grading re-considered you must follow the following steps:

Take the material to the TA along with a note describing specifically what you believe the problem to be. (Make a copy of your note and the problem set / exam for your own safekeeping.) Leave the material and note with the TA along with your email address.
After the TA has contacted you by email, come to the TA's office to discuss the question.

This procedure is designed to help to ensure fair grading by providing your TA with an opportunity to think about your questions carefully before responding.

Schedule

Class topics and readings are subject to revision. It is possible that some topics and related readings will be dropped if time runs short.

Course Outline

(*) Starred readings are required.

1.1. Overview of the Course

1.2. Review of Supply and Demand

1.3. Microeconomic Models, Comparative Statics, and Optimization

(*) Nicholson. Chap. 1 and 2.

Pindyck and Rubinfeld. Chap. 1.1-1.3.

(*) Krugman, Paul. "The Accidental Theorist." Slate (January 23, 1997).

(*) Card, David, and Alan B. Krueger. "Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania." American Economic Review 84, no. 4 (September 1994): 772-93.

(*) Freeman, Richard. "Comment: Review Symposium on Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 48, no. 4 (July 1995).

(*) Kennan, John. "The Elusive Effects of Minimum Wages." Journal of Economic Literature 33 (December, 1995): 1950-65.

Card, David, and Alan B. Krueger. "Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage." Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

2. Choice and the Theory of Demand

2.1. Rationality Axioms, Utility, and Indifference Curves

2.2. Constrained Utility Maximization, Demand Functions, Indirect Utility, the Expenditure Function

2.3. Individual Demand, Income and Substitution Effects

2.4. Substitutes and Complements, Market Demand, and Elasticities

2.5. Price Indices

(*) Nicholson. Chap. 3-7.

(*) Dwyer, G. P., and C. M. Lindsey. "Robert Giffen and the Irish Potato." American Economic Review (March 1984): 188-192.

(*) Waldfogel, Joel. "The Deadweight Loss of Christmas." American Economic Review 83, no. 5 (1993): 1328-36.

(*) Boskin, Michael, et al. "Toward a More Accurate Measure of the Cost of Living." Interim report to the Senate Finance Committee from the Advisory Commission to Study the Consumer Price Index. September 15, 1995.

(*) Krugman, Paul. "The CPI and the Rat Race." Slate (December 21, 1996).

3. Choice and Uncertainty, and Information

3.1. Uncertainty, Risk, Von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility.

(*) Nicholson. Chap. 8.

(*) Kane, Thomas J., and Douglas Staiger. "Teen Motherhood and Abortion Access." Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, no. 2 (1996): 467-506.

4. Prices, Perfect Competition, General Equilibrium and Economic Efficiency

4.1. Economic Efficiency and Welfare Analysis

4.2. General Competitive Equilibrium

4.3. Trade, Comparative Advantage, Competitiveness, and Redistribution

(*) Nicholson. Chap. 15, 16, and 17.

(*) Scherer, F. M. "The U.S. Sugar Program." In Kennedy School of Government Case. 1992, pp. 1128.0.

(*) Krugman, Paul. "Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession." Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (March - April, 1994): 28-44.

(*) Krugman, Paul. "A Raspberry for Free Trade." Slate (November 21, 1997).

(*) Krugman, Paul. "The Tax Reform Obsession." New York Times Magazine (April 7, 1996): 36-37.

5. Information Economics: Insurance, Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Signaling.

(*) Nicholson. Chap. 8 and 9. (Warning: sadly, chap. 9 is a poor introduction to the topic of information.)

(*) Rothschild, Michael, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Information." Quarterly Journal of Economics 90, no. 4 (1976): 630-649.

(*) Altman, Daniel, David M. Cutler, and Richard J. Zeckhauser. "Adverse Selection and Adverse Retention." American Economic Review 88, no. 2 (1998): 122-126.

(*) Akerlof, George A. "The Market for 『Lemons:』 Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism." Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, no. 3 (August 1970): 488-500.

(*) Spence, Michael. "Job Market Signaling." Quarterly Journal of Economics 87, no. 3 (1973): 355-374.

(*) Tyler, John H., Richard J. Murnane, and John B. Willet. "Estimating the Labor Market Signaling Value of the GED." Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, no. 2 (2000): 431-468.

6. Game Theory and Applications to Network Externalities in the Information Age

(*) Nicholson. Chap. 10.

Recommended: Gibbons. Game Theory for Applied Economists. Chap. 1 and 2.

(*) David, Paul E. "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY." American Economic Review 75, no. 2 (1985): 332-337.

(*) Shapiro, Carl, and Hal R. Varian. Information Rules. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999, Chap. 3 and 7, pp. 173-226.

(*) Krugman, Paul. "Entertainment Values." Slate (January 22, 1998).